We propose a framework for analyzing transformations of the demand facing a monopolist. Our approach is based on the observation that such transformations frequently stem from changes in the dispersion of consumers' valuations, which lead to rotations of the demand curve. In a wide variety of settings, profits are a U-shaped function of dispersion. The monopolist will adopt a mass-market posture when dispersion is low, and a niche posture when dispersion is high. We investigate numerous applications of our framework, including product design and development; advertising, marketing and sales advice; and the construction of quality-differentiated product lines. We also suggest a new taxonomy of advertising, distinguishing between hype, which shifts demand, and real information, which rotates demand.
Shaping Consumer Demand
The shape of the demand curve for a product is fundamental to the behavior and profitability of a supplier. Demand is influenced by many factors, some of which are exogenous, such as consumers' incomes and preferences, and others of which are endogenous. For instance, advertising, marketing, and product design are all activities that shape demand. Here we develop an approach to analyzing the changing demand for a monopolist's product that is broadly applicable and yet easily understood in terms of basic economic concepts. This approach stems from the observation that demand-shaping activities often change the dispersion of consumers' valuations, which leads not to a shift but rather to a rotation of the demand curve.
To motivate our study, first consider an alteration to a product's original design. If consumers unanimously prefer the new version then the consequences are simple: The demand curve shifts outward, so that for any given quantity, revenue must increase. Thus, a monopolist will modify the design unless there are countervailing factors such as an increase in costs.
In other situations, product design is less straightforward. For example, a design change may appeal to some consumers, while displeasing others. Often this will correspond to a change in the dispersion of demand (by which we mean an increase in the dispersion of the distribution of consumers' willingness-to-pay) rather than a simple shift.
As further motivation, consider advertising and marketing activities. If product promotion is unambiguously persuasive, or informs consumers of a product's existence, then it will shift the demand curve outward. As with product design, however, the effects may be more complex. This will be so when advertising provides pre-sales information that enables consumers to better ascertain their true underlying idiosyncratic preferences for the product. For instance, a marketing campaign may provide many details of a product's style and function, or it may simply hype the product's existence. Providing detailed information may discourage some customers from purchasing while encouraging others. Thus, the consequence of providing information is an increase in the dispersion of demand.
Our approach encompasses such situations in which the shape of a demand curve is determined by the dispersion of consumers' willingness-to-pay. While this analysis is somewhat more subtle than that involving mere shifts in demand, the end results nonetheless turn out to be fairly straightforward. The reason is that an increase in dispersion frequently induces a clockwise rotation of the demand curve. Therefore, understanding the simple economics of demand rotation suffices to comprehend the motivations for a monopolist to mold demand (or to understand responses consequent to an exogenous demand transformation) in a variety of settings. Thus we consider a family of demand curves indexed by a sequence of clockwise rotations, and investigate the effect of increased dispersion.
When consumers' valuations for the product are relatively homogeneous, the demand curve will be relatively flat. Typically, a monopolist will choose to serve a large fraction of potential consumers. Heuristically, the marginal consumer is "below average" in the distribution of valuations. Following an increase in dispersion, the demand curve rotates clockwise. This will push the willingness-to-pay of the marginal consumer down, and monopoly profits will fall. Eventually, the steepening demand curve will prompt the monopolist to restrict sales to a relatively small fraction of potential consumers. The marginal consumer will then be "above average" and respond positively to increases in dispersion; monopoly profits increase as the demand curve rotates clockwise. Building upon this intuition we show that, in a wide variety of circumstances, monopoly profits are "U-shaped" (that is, quasi-convex) in the dispersion of demand. Such profits achieve a maximum when the dispersion is either maximized or minimized. Consequently, a monopolist will wish to use any tools at her disposal, such as her advertising and product-design decisions, to pursue one of these two extremes. We identify, therefore, two distinct marketing mixes that the monopolist may wish to deploy. First, the monopolist may stake out a "mass market" position, in which her product is sold to many consumers. In this case, her goal is to minimize the dispersion of demand. In pursuit of this goal, the product will be designed to have universal appeal, with controversial design features being eschewed; it will offer something for everyone. Any advertising will highlight the existence of the product, but will not allow consumers precisely to learn of their true match with the product's characteristics. Such a marketing mix will ensure that consumers share similar valuations for the product, so that we will see a "plain vanilla" product design promoted by an advertising campaign consisting of "pure hype." Second, the alternative is the adoption of a "niche" position, where few units are sold. The monopolist aims to maximize the dispersion of demand. The product design will have extreme characteristics that appeal to specialized tastes; it will pander to the highest extreme. Many consumers will strongly dislike the product, but those who like it will love it. This product design will be accompanied by advertising and detailed sales advice containing "real information" that allows consumers to learn of their true match with the product's attributes.
A number of applications flow from our basic observation that many factors influence the shape of demand. For instance, building upon the intuition above, we introduce a new taxonomy of advertising, distinguising between hype and real information. Promotional hype corresponds to the traditional notions of informative and persuasive advertising. It highlights the existence of the product, promotes any feature that is unambiguously valuable, or otherwise increases the willingness-to-pay of all consumers; it shifts the demand curve outward. Real information, on the other hand, allows a consumer to learn of his personal match with the product's characteristics; as we show, it rotates the demand curve. Employing this taxonomy, we study an advertising life-cycle in which a monopolist's choice of both the intensity of an advertising campaign and its real-information content change over time in response to consumer learning. We also examine the decision to introduce an improved version of an existing product, and relate this to issues such as the existing stock of consumer knowledge regarding the brand. Furthermore, we are able to ascertain the response of these decisions to other endogenous variables, such as the product's design, as well as exogenous variables, such as inequality in the income distribution.
Our results are not artifacts of an assumption that a monopolist sells but a single product: We extend our analysis to a multiproduct monopolist offering a product line of vertically differentiated goods. In this setting a consumer's type corresponds to a preference for increased quality, and monopoly profits are U-shaped in the dispersion of such types. We also present a number of comparative statics relating the length and mix of a product line to consumer-type dispersion. For instance, when types are more disperse a monopolist will tend to serve a smaller overall share of the market, but do so with more products.
Our work is related to several distinct fields of economic inquiry. We believe that fully conveying such relationships is best accomplished by deferring thorough review to the individual subsequent sections. However, a few notes are in order here. In Section 2, we investigate the response of a single-product monopolist's profits and output to the dispersion of demand. Our notion of dispersion builds upon the classic work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971) and the single-crossing property of distribution functions studied by Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) and Hammond (1974) . In Section 3 we apply our theory to product design and development. Our approach to product design is based upon Lancastrian (1966 Lancastrian ( , 1971 ) characteristics, and the analysis of product development is assisted by a result of Jewitt (1987) . In Section 4 we turn to advertising, sales advice and other marketing activities. Our study of the incentives to equip consumers with private information exploits the insights of Lewis and Sappington (1991, 1994) , and complements Ottaviani and Prat's (2001) work on public information supply. Section 5's consideration of a multiproduct monopolist selling vertically differentiated goods builds upon the classic Mussa-Rosen (1978) model.
Taken together, a fundamental point emerging from our results is that demand-transforming events interact with a broad array of decision variables, so that reaching a better understanding of these events is critical to understanding a firm's overall activities. Equally important is that studying changes in the dispersion of demand frequently reduces to the study of simple rotations of demand, so that basic economic intuition is all that is required to explore a range of issues including advertising, marketing, and product design.
Demand Dispersion and a Monopolist's Preference for Extremes
Our goal here is to provide the core theoretical framework upon which we build in later sections. We consider a scenario in which a monopolist sells a single product, and investigate the relationship between the shape of the distribution of consumers' willingness-to-pay and the monopolist's profits, quantity, and price.
2.1. A Single-Product Monopoly Model. A single-product monopolist serves a unit mass of consumers, each of whom has (at most) unit demand for her product. An individual consumer's type θ ∈ R is his valuation, or his willingness-to-pay, for a single unit: Facing a price of p ≥ 0, he demands a single unit of the product if and only if θ > p. The type θ does not necessarily represent a consumer's true payoff (in monetary terms) from consumption: At the time of purchase, a consumer might well be uncertain of either the product's precise attributes, or indeed his own tastes. Our interpretation is that θ represents the certainty equivalent of the lottery obtained from a purchase. Thus, if a consumer is risk-neutral, then θ is his expected monetary valuation for a single unit of the product. On the cost side, if the monopolist supplies z units then she incurs costs of C(z).
We consider a family of distributions {F s (θ)} indexed by s ∈ S = [s L , s H ] ⊆ R. For a particular s, types are drawn from F s (θ), with support on some open interval of R. F s (θ) is twice continuously differentiable in θ and s, and f s (θ) is its strictly positive density.
Fixing s, F s (θ) yields a demand curve: At a price of p, z = 1−F s (p) consumers will purchase, yielding revenue of p(1 − F s (p)). At times, we will find it convenient to view the monopolist as setting quantity rather than price. To this end, we write P s (z) for the type (or willingnessto-pay) of the consumer with a mass z of others above him. Hence, if the monopolist wishes to sell z units, then she must set a price of p = P s (z). Thus P s (z) is the inverse-demand curve, and must satisfy z = 1 − F s (P s (z)), or equivalently P s (z) = F −1 s (1 − z). We write π(s) for the monopolist's maximized profits given a consumer-valuation distribution F s (θ). When uniquely defined (for instance, when marginal revenue is decreasing and costs are convex) we write z * s for the monopoly quantity and p * s for the monopoly price:
π(s) = max z∈ [0, 1] {zP s (z) − C(z)}, z * s = arg max z∈ [0, 1] {zP s (z) − C(z)}, and p * s = P s (z * s ).
2.2.
Indexing the Shape of Consumer Demand. Exogenous shifts in the environment, and actions taken by the monopolist, the consumers, or some third party, may all influence the distribution F s (θ) (equivalently, the demand curve) faced by the monopolist, and hence her profitability. An exploration of this relationship between the nature of demand and profitability requires a comparison of F s (θ) and F r (θ) for r, s ∈ S. If F s (θ) is higher than F r (θ) in the sense of strict first-order stochastic dominance (following classic definitions, such as that of Lehmann (1955) , so that F s (θ) < F r (θ) for all θ) then the inverse-demand curve shifts up from P r (z) to P s (z), and the monopolist's profits must increase. For instance, if the monopolist benefits from a product innovation that is unambiguously valued by all consumers, then her profits will rise. Similarly, if advertising (perhaps the promotion of a product innovation) convinces all consumers of the product's merits, then profits again will be higher (putting aside potential changes in the cost structure).
Simple shifts in demand, however, are not our primary focus. We wish to consider the shape of the demand curve, and in particular situations in which F s (θ) is "more disperse" or "more heterogeneous" than F r (θ).
2 For instance, and as discussed in Section 1, a modification to the product's design may increase the valuation of some consumers, while reducing the valuation of others. Similarly, advertising or sales advice may convince some consumers of the product's merits, while persuading others that the product does not meet their needs. We consider concrete examples of these scenarios in Sections 3-4. For our preliminary analysis, however, we require a measure of "riskiness" to rank different distributions. These figures illustrate the density and distribution functions for two normal distributions: N (µ r , σ r ) and N (µ s , σ s ), where µ r = 1.75, σ r = 0.5, µ s = 2 and σ s = 2.
Figure 1. Spread and Rotation for the Normal Distribution
An immediate candidate for such a measure is second-order stochastic dominance. Following the familiar Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) 
. Under this definition, these two distributions must share a common mean:
4 Furthermore, for two distributions so ranked, F s (θ) may be obtained from F r (θ) via a sequence of mean-preserving spreads. Although we do not use the concept of second-order stochastic dominance directly, we do build upon the familiar idea that two distributions may differ by a (not necessarily mean-preserving) spread. Specifically, we say that F s (θ) is a spread of F r (θ) if F s (θ) is obtained by moving density away from the center of F r (θ) and toward the upper and lower tails.
Definition 1 insists that F r (θ) and F s (θ) cross at some point θ † sr . We could, of course, weaken this by permitting pairs of distributions that do not cross, and hence are ordered by first-order stochastic dominance; this would be accomplished by allowing θ † sr to take values outside the support of θ. Hammond (1974) allowed for distributions that are either simply intertwined (this differs slightly from our definition, by allowing for distributions that coincide on some interval) or first-order-dominance ranked. When one of these orderings holds, the distributions are "simply related." Hammond (1974 Hammond ( , p. 1069 observed that many families of distributions have members that are all simply related, including the (separate) families of uniform, normal, geometric, exponential, gamma and beta distributions. 11 When all distributions in the family share a common mean, a local-rotation ordering is sufficient to ensure that any distinct pair of distributions are ordered by second-order stochastic dominance. A partial converse is also true. For instance, suppose that, for a finite setS, distributions are ordered by second-order stochastic dominance. Following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) and Machina and Pratt (1997) , we may construct a sequence of mean-preserving spreads (and hence rotations) linking each pair. In such a manner, we may obtain an (expanded) family of distributions ordered by a sequence of local rotations. 12 If we were to specify a family of demand curves index by decreasing elasticity, then we would need to specify whether the elasticities of two curves are to be compared at a common quantity, or a common price. Whatever the convention adopted, if P s (z) to be less elastic than P r (z) then it must be steeper whenever the demand curves cross. This further implies that they must cross only once. Thus an elasticity-ordered family of demand curves must be ordered by a sequence of local rotations. 13 If a family is ordered by a sequence of local rotations, then the distributions of any increasing transformation of θ are so ordered. Hence Definition 2 could be weakened, while retaining many of our results, by allowing for distributions corresponding to an increasing transformation of θ to satisfy the definition. • Thus F s (θ) has a mean of µ(s), a standard deviation of σ(s), and inverse-demand
where P (z) = F −1 (1 − z). Insisting that σ (s) > 0 ensures that the family is ordered by a sequence of local rotations. 14 Since σ (s) > 0 is required, it is without loss of generality to set σ(s) = s when convenient, yielding the inverse-demand function P s (z) = µ(s) + sP (z). Many specifications meet the requirements of Definition 2. For instance, a family of normal distributions (from which the illustrations of Figure 1 are taken) does so.
2.3. Quasi-Convexity of Profits and a Preference for Extremes. We turn now to consider the response of the monopolist's profits to changes in the dispersion index s. We have noted that, from a quantity-setting perspective, her inverse-demand curve rotates clockwise around z from θ † s . Hence, it pushes the type (and willingness-to-pay) of the marginal consumer down. Since the price is determined by the identity of the marginal consumer, and not the average consumer, both the price and profits fall. In contrast, when z * s < z † s , the monopolist acts as a "niche" operator, by restricting supply to a smaller fraction of the potential consumer base. The same logic ensures that profits increase with s. Employing the envelope theorem,
This does not suffice to characterize the effect of increases in s across the entire interval S, since the sign of (z * s − z † s ) might well change a number of times. There is, however, a simple sufficient condition that ensures that the sign changes at most once.
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Proposition 1. Suppose that the family of distributions {F s (θ)} s∈S is ordered by a sequence of local rotations. Further suppose that the rotation point θ † s is decreasing in s, or equivalently that the rotation quantity z † s is increasing in s. Then π(s) is a quasi-convex function of s. max s∈S π(s) ∈ {π(s L ), π(s H )}, and hence the monopolist prefers the extremes s L and s H .
Quasi-convex profits are highest when consumers' valuations are either as heterogeneous as possible, or as homogeneous as possible. If the monopolist were able to choose s, then she would take either an extreme niche posture (by setting s = s H ) or an extreme massmarket posture (the opposite extreme of s = s L ). Furthermore, as either s L or s H increase, π(s H ) − π(s L ) crosses from negative to positive at most once.
Proposition 1 follows from the observation that, as s rises, the monopolist will never switch from a niche position to a mass-market position. If she were to do so, then we could find
As s rises from s to s , the rotation quantity z † s increases, and hence ∂P s (z * s )/∂s > 0 throughout. Similarly, ∂P s (z * s )/∂s < 0 over the same interval. But this implies that, for s = s , a supply of z * s is strictly more profitable than a supply of z * s . This is a contradiction. It follows that the monotonicity of z † s is sufficient (but not necessary) to guarantee that once s is sufficiently large to make a niche operation optimal, the monopolist will never wish to switch back to mass-market supply. This ensures that π (s) remains positive for all larger s, and π(s) is a quasi-convex (hence either monotonic or "U-shaped") function.
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Monotonicity of z † s (equivalently, θ † s ) is straighforward to check. If z < z † s , then ∂P s (z)/∂s > 0, so that the price is locally increasing in s. Since z † s is increasing, the same is true for 16 Proofs omitted from the text are contained in Appendix A. 17 Figure 2 illustrates this result, where F s (θ) is drawn from a family of normal distributions. Consider an s such that z larger s. Thus, fixing z, ∂P s (z)/∂s > 0 crosses zero at most once, and this must be an upcrossing. Equivalently, the price P s (z) is, for fixed z, a quasi-convex function of the dispersion parameter s. This observation forms part of the following lemma. Lemma 1. When the family {F s (θ s )} s∈S is ordered by a sequence of local rotations,
s is an increasing function of s, (3) F s (θ) is a quasi-concave function of s for all θ, and (4) P s (z) is a quasi-convex function of s for all z, are all equivalent statements. Further, if the family is ordered by a sequence of mean-variance shifts, then (i)-(iv) hold if and only if µ (s)/σ (s) is weakly increasing in s.
For a family of distributions ordered by a sequence of mean-variance shifts (Definition 2) the requirement that µ (s)/σ (s) be weakly increasing is equivalent to the inequality µ (s)σ (s) ≥ µ (s)σ (s).
18 Of course, in the mean-variance shift case, we may set σ(s) = s without loss, and reduce the final statement of Lemma 1 to µ (s) ≥ 0: As we move through the varianceordered family of distributions, the mean is a convex function of the standard deviation.
As we show subsequently, the conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied for many applications. Furthermore, an alternative proof of Proposition 1 follows from the observations that (i) Lemma 1 applies, so that P s (z) is quasi-convex in s, and (ii) π(s) = max z∈[0,1] {zP s (z)−C(z)} is the maximum of quasi-convex functions, and so is itself quasi-convex. 2.4. Niche versus Mass-Market Operation. In the previous section we categorized a monopolist's posture as either being a niche or a mass-market one, depending on whether she is serving fewer or more than z † s consumers, respectively. Here we continue to make use of this distinction, and show how it is useful in categorizing the change in the monopolist's optimal output z * s in response to shifts in s. Detailed comparative statics require more structure than that possessed by an arbitrary family of demand curves ordered by local rotations. The reason is that such comparative statics depend on properties of marginal revenue, and the rotation ordering is broad enough 18 If µ(s) is increasing, then this inequality is equivalent to −µ (s)/µ (s) ≤ −σ (s)/σ (s), which says that µ(s) is less concave than σ(s), in the Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964) sense. 19 Notice that this proof applies even when the family of distributions is not ordered by a sequence of local rotations. As suggested in Footnote 8, Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 may be modified to cope with more generality. Exploring this, notice that for a family ordered by a sequence of local rotations, θ † s the is only valuation at which demand is stationary (to first order) in response to a local change in s. More generally, there may be many such points. We can subdivide such rotation points into an ordered, alternating, sequence of two types: Clockwise rotation points (the inverse-demand curve steepens with s), and anti-clockwise rotation points (inverse-demand becomes shallower with s). For quasi-convexity of profits, we require any clockwise rotation to be decreasing, and any anti-clockwise rotation point to be increasing.
to impose few restrictions on the dependence of marginal revenue on s. Therefore, we specialize to the case of mean-variance shifts (Definition 2), taking σ(s) = s and µ (s) ≥ 0 so that Proposition 1 holds. We also assume that C(z) is convex and differentiable, and that P s (z) exhibits decreasing marginal revenue. Note that, since P s (z) = µ(s) + sP (z), marginal revenue is given by
where MR(z) is the marginal revenue associated with the inverse-demand curve P (z). Thus, P s (z) exhibits decreasing marginal revenue exactly when MR(z) is decreasing, i.e., whenever the foundational inverse-demand curve P (z) exhibits decreasing marginal revenue.
This common assumption of decreasing marginal revenue MR(z) turns out to have powerful consequences in this setting. It ensures that increases in s correspond to clockwise rotations not only of the inverse-demand curve P s (z), but also of the marginal revenue curve MR s (z). This in turn generates a number of other results, summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the family of distributions is ordered by a sequence of meanvariance shifts, so that Turning back to the monopoly supply z * s , and for a constant marginal cost c,
s is decreasing for all s, (7) otherwise z * s is non-monotonic, and minimized for interiors ∈ (s L , s H ). Finally, (8) if µ(s) = µ for all s, then z * s is increasing for µ > c, and decreasing for µ < c.
Because marginal revenue rotates (clockwise) around some rotation quantity z ‡ s as s increases, comparative statics on the monopoly output depend on whether MR ‡ s = MR s (z ‡ s ) is above or below marginal cost.
20 Since z ‡ s < z † s , this is in turn connected to whether the monopolist is adopting a niche or a mass-market posture. This is easiest to see when there is a constant marginal cost, and so we suppose for discussion purposes that C(z) = cz. 
Category
Marginal Cost Output ∂π(s)/∂s ∂z * Example 1 generates a simple linear demand curve: P s (z) = µ + s(1 − 2z). As s increases, this demand curve rotates around the constant rotation point characterized by θ † = µ and
, so that Proposition 1 applies. Furthermore, increases in dispersion are both mean and median preserving. We also observe that profits z(P s (z) − c) are linear in s. Thus
is the maximum of convex functions and is itself convex; a stronger conclusion than that of Proposition 1.
To explore this example, we consider two separate cases. First, suppose that µ < c. Since the mean valuation is below the marginal cost, for sufficiently small s no consumer valuation is above c, and hence the monopolist is unable to operate profitably: z * s = 0. For larger s, supply becomes profitable, and the monopolist sets z * s > 0. The marginal valuation must satisfy P s (z * ) > c > µ = P s (z † ), and hence the monopolist always restricts supply to a minority of the customer base; she is always a niche operator, and hence profits always increase with s.
Second, suppose that µ > c. So long as z is sufficiently small, supply is always profitable, so that z * s > 0 for all s. When s is sufficiently small, the monopolist finds it optimal to set z * s = 1, and serve the entire customer base. For larger s, however, the monopolist switches from mass-market supply to become a niche operator. A fuller characterization of the monopolist's behavior and profitability is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For Example 1, π(s) is convex and minimized by s = max{µ − c, 0}. Also,
(2) the monopolist sets z * s = (s + µ − c)/4s, and obtains profits π(s) = (s + µ − c) 2 /8s.
and where the critical value for s H is decreasing in s L .
Observe that, so long as Before concluding our analysis of Example 1, we remove the restriction that changes in s are mean-preserving. Allowing for general µ(s) ensures that the rotation point θ † s will move with s. So long as µ(s) is convex, profits remain convex in s (following Proposition 2). Furthermore, if µ(s) is linear (and hence weakly concave) π(s) remains convex. Thus, to overturn the convexity of profits, µ(s) must be strictly concave in some regions. 
Product Design and Development
In Section 2, we indexed a family of valuation distributions by riskiness. Under Proposition 1 or 2, the monopolist prefers the family's extremes. Here we describe product development and design decisions that yield such risk-indexed families, thereby providing a microfoundation for our earlier analysis. We refer to product development as the process of adding new features to a product. In contrast, a product's design is viewed as a bundle of different characteristics, valuations for which may be correlated. In both scenarios, the monopolist's profits are maximized by choosing extreme values of design and development controls. We also consider the impact of an exogenous change in the shape of consumer demand on the 21 Suppose that µ(s) is twice continuously differentiable, and that π(s) achieves a profitable (π(s) > 0) local maximum for some interior s ∈ (s L , s H ). Straightforward algebra reveals that µ (s) ≤ −(s + µ(s))/4s 2 < 0. Thus µ(s) must be sufficiently concave for interior maxima to arise; quasi-convexity of the inverse-demand function P s (z), and the associated monotonicity of z † s and θ † s are not necessary for the monopolist to prefer the extremes of [s L , s H ]. Equivalently, profits may be quasi-convex even if θ † s grows with s. monopolist's choices. Specifically, we investigate how an increase in the inequality of income might prompt her to switch her design and development decisions.
3.1. Product Development. A monopolist with a basic product design is deciding which additional features to incorporate. For instance, she may be deciding on the number of features present in a personal digital assistant (PDA). It may be that new features are, on average, beneficial in the sense that they increase the average willingness-to-pay of consumers. However, different consumers disagree on how valuable any given feature is, and so adding more features increases the dispersion of demand. For example, adding telephony capabilities may appeal less to those who already have mobile phones, or similarly adding more applications may benefit some while annoying others who find that they muddle the interface. Intuitively, the monopolist may face a tradeoff, as adding new features in a sense may both shift the demand curve outwards, yet also rotate it. Of course, given our previous work, it is not surprising that the firm may desire either increased or reduced dispersion, so that even if new features detract on average from consumers' willingness-to-pay, they may still optimally be incorporated if increased dispersion is preferred.
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To investigate further, we suppose that the monopolist begins with a basic product design. A consumer's valuation θ 0 for it is drawn from F 0 (θ 0 ). For simplicity, we assume that this distribution has a strictly positive density f 0 (θ 0 ) on the real line.
23 If the monopolist chooses to retain the basic design, then a consumer's willingness-to-pay satisfies θ = θ 0 , and hence is drawn from F 0 (θ). Next, we allow the monopolist to develop her product via a cumulative sequence of design innovations. In a discrete setting, there are n steps in this process. A consumer's valuation for the ith innovation is ε i , drawn from G i (ε i ) with density g i (ε i ) on R. If the monopolist follows the development process up to the ith step, then a consumer's willingness-to-pay satisfies θ = θ 0 + j≤i ε j , with distribution F i (θ). For many specifications, the sequence {F i (θ i )} i∈{1,...,n} will be ordered by some notion of riskiness.
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22 For instance, BMW's installation of the "iDrive" system in its 5-series and 7-series automobiles has generated some controversy in the press. In an early review, Hutton (2001) described it as "a computer-age control system which eliminates the forest of buttons on the dashboard and replaces them with menus on a screen, accessed by a control knob on the centre console." Such a system does not appeal to everyone; many reviewers described the system as confusing for the typical user. Referring to such reviewers, Wilkinson (2002) commented that "everybody . . . praised the car but used the occasion to take potshots at . . . the iDrive system." Nevertheless, some drivers will appreciate its merits. Wilkinson (2002) went on to quote a BMW engineer's claim that "West Coast early adopters love the iDrive from the beginning, while the East Coast Luddites are much more conservative." Putting his stereotypes aside, his claim was that some love the iDrive system, while others hate it; an increase in the dispersion of valuations. 23 We could restrict support to some open interval of R, at the cost of introducing additional notation. 24 Product development will not necessarily increase the riskiness of consumer valuations. For instance, if ε 1 = µ − θ 0 , then for i = 1, F 1 (θ) will be a degenerate distribution with all mass at θ = µ. For this specification, the first step in the development process offsets all risk in the initial distribution F 0 (θ).
To illustrate this, we suppose that consumer valuations for the basic design and innovation steps are all independent, so that var
, and an increase in i raises the variance of consumer valuations. Our criterion for increased riskiness, however, is a rotation (Definition 1), and we require further conditions on F 0 (θ 0 ) and {G i (ε i )} to allow its use. Thankfully, adding an independent innovation to a distribution results in a rotation so long as both underlying distributions are strongly unimodal (see, e.g., Jewitt 1987) , where a variable is strongly unimodal if its density is log-concave. 25 Such strong unimodality ensures that rotations may be used to index riskiness, but does not imply that the monopolist should take an "all or nothing" approach to product development. To move further, we turn to a specific example. We begin by specifying a function µ(s) : [0, 1] → R, and assume that θ 0 ∼ N (µ(0), σ 2 ). µ(0) represents the mean consumer valuation given that no product development takes place. Next, we suppose that ε i ∼ N (∆µ i , κ 2 /n), where
Thus each development step yields a normally distributed innovation to consumer valuations. The density of the normal is log concave, and hence i indexes a sequence of rotations. Furthermore, for a specified i, θ ∼ N (µ(s), σ 2 + sκ 2 ) where s = i/n. Finally, we consider the properties of µ(s). We have assumed that each of the innovative steps are homoskedastic, with variance κ 2 /n. Given this, we would expect the monopolist to adopt the most-valuable development-changes first, so that ∆µ i ≥ ∆µ i+1 . 26 This amounts to a concavity restriction on µ(s). Gathering these elements, and allowing n → ∞, yields the following specification.
, where µ(s) is concave.
Applying Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, conditions under which profits are quasi-convex readily emerge. First, note that by assumption, µ(s) is concave. If the standard deviation of θ were equal to s, then we would require convexity of µ(s) to apply our results (Proposition 2). Here, however, the standard deviation of θ is σ(s) = √ σ 2 + sκ 2 , which is concave in s. Hence, if µ(s) is (for instance) linear in s, then the mean will be a convex function of the standard deviation. More generally, profits are quasi-convex so long as µ(s) is "not too concave" in s. 
then monopoly profits are quasi-convex function in s, and maximized for some s ∈ {0, 1}.
25 Log-concave densities include the normal, uniform, exponential, and members of the beta and gamma families. See Jewitt (1987, p. 80) and Barndorff-Nielsen (1978, pp. 93-97) for more details. In the terminology of Karlin and Proschan (1960) , a strongly unimodal distribution has a Pólya frequency density of order 2. In fact, the stated result follows from work in that paper and other contributions of Karlin (1957 Karlin ( , 1968 . 26 Note that we do not require the product development steps to increase the expected valuation. Hence this assumption might amount to the introduction of the least-damaging development-changes first.
Intuitively, the reason quasi-convexity may fail when this condition does not hold is as follows. Suppose that profits were increasing in some range, but then the above inequality failed. Since profits were increasing, the monopolist must have been pricing to a consumer above the rotation point. As the inequality fails, it may be that the rotation point of demand moves upwards so that, heuristically, the marginal consumer no longer prefers additional features. This causes profits to fall in a region, destroying quasi-convexity.
On the other hand, this condition is sufficient, not necessary, for quasi-convexity. For instance, suppose that µ (s) < 0 and µ (s) < 0. Then the condition above cannot hold. Moreover, on average consumers disdain new features. Nonetheless, profits can easily be quasi-convex. For instance, they may be monotonic when the monopolist takes an extreme niche posture. New features lower the average willingness-to-pay, shifting the demand curve in. However, these features also rotate the demand curve. Since the marginal consumer is (potentially) well above the rotation point, profits increase as new features are added.
We have considered a monopolist who is able to add features to her product. When valuations for features are independent, new features increase the riskiness of the valuation distribution, and may also change the mean. Our analysis identifies the tradeoffs faced when deciding whether to incorporate additional features to an existing product. In a mass-market, a hesitant monopolist retains her original design; in a niche market, she is eager to innovate. We now turn to a different situation, in which she chooses the mix of features in her product.
3.2. Product Design. As a second application of our results, we consider a problem of product design faced by a monopolist who must assemble her product from a convex function of different characteristics. 27 Thus, in contrast to our analysis above, where the firm decided whether to add new features or not, the firm must choose the mix of some set of features. For instance, we might imagine that the monopolist operates a restaurant, and is deciding upon the exact combination of different ingredients that go into a meal. 28 Thus we are taking Lancaster's (1971) "characteristics" approach, in which (Lancaster 1975, p. 567 ) the consumer "is assumed to derive . . . satisfaction from characteristics which cannot in general 27 Thus the final product is a bundle of these different characteristics. It follows that our analysis is closely related to the contributions of Stigler (1968) , Adams and Yellen (1976) , Schmalensee (1982 , 1984 ), and McAfee, McMillian, and Whinston (1989 . These authors analyzed the incentive of a multiproduct monopolist to sell goods separately, or to employ pure or mixed bundles. The difference here is increasing the contribution of one characteristic to the mix entails the reduction of another. Nevertheless, our results just below illustrate how combinations of negatively correlated characteristics may be used to reduce the risk in the distribution of consumer valuations, as in Figure I of McAfee et al (1989) .
be purchased directly, but are incorporated in goods." Other examples include automobiles and computers, which may be blends of performance, practicality, size, and weight.
We impose two simplifications. First, the expected valuation for the final product is invariant to the exact combination of characteristics. Thus, in contrast to our discussion of product development, the average value of the product is constant for any design, where the average is taken across all potential customers. Second, we again adopt the normal distribution. Consumer valuations for the product are normally distributed, and satisfy
where σ 2 i is the variance of characteristic i, and ρ ij is the correlation coefficient between η i and η j . From Section 2, the inverse demand curve is given by P s (z) = µ + sP (z), where P (z) = Φ −1 (1 − z); from the monopolist's viewpoint the characteristics mix matters only insofar as it influences the variance s 2 of consumer valuations. Increases in s correspond to rotations of demand and, since µ being constant implies that the rotation point is fixed, Proposition 1 applies: A monopolist chooses to either minimize or maximize s.
To understand the implications for the characteristics mix, observe that s 2 is convex in the weights {α i }. To maximize s, the monopolist will wish to place all weight on the characteristic with the highest variance: She will "pander to the highest extreme." Many consumers will strongly dislike this product, but those who like it will love it; the demand curve is very steep for high values of s. In contrast, to minimize s, the monopolist will often choose an interior solution (i.e., α i ∈ (0, 1) for each i) that offers "something for everyone." This product will not arouse strong disagreement, so that the distribution of willingness-topay is clumped around the mean µ; the demand curve is shallow for small values of s.
Proposition 5. For Example 3, a monopolist will wish to either (i) set α i = 1 where σ 2 i ∈ max j {σ 2 j }, or (ii) choose the unique vector of convex weights α * to minimize α Σα.
While there is neither uncertainty nor risk aversion here, an analogy to optimal portfolio selection exists. The design of a product bundle with something for everyone is equivalent to that of a risk-averse individual choosing a portfolio of stocks with arbitrary covariance matrix but common expected returns. This can be illustrated via the n = 2 case. 29 Thus
, so long as this is an interior solution (i.e., ρ 12 < min{σ 1 /σ 2 , σ 2 /σ 1 }). This, then, represents the optimal Lancastrian bundle of characteristics when a monopolist wishes to take a massmarket posture. From a portfolio choice perspective, several comparative statics emerge readily. For instance, if the preferences for the two attributes are mostly uncorrelated, then their relative variances are sufficient to determine the optimal mix, with the higher variance attribute receiving less weight. Similarly, an increase in ρ 12 increases the weight on the first attribute if and only if it has a lower variance than the second attribute.
3.3. The Effect of Income Inequality. In our first two applications the monopolist influenced the riskiness of the valuation distribution via her design and development decisions. There are, of course, exogeneous factors that influence this distribution. For our third application, we consider the effect of the distribution of income on the monopolist's posture.
A consumer's valuation for a product depends on his income, as well as his tastes. For a normal good, an increase in income will increase the willingness-to-pay. Even if all consumers share the same tastes (for a "plain vanilla" product, perhaps) variation in income will yield a non-degenerate distribution of consumer valuations. An increase in income inequality may result in an increase in the upper and lower bounds to the dispersion of consumer valuations. This suggests that an increase in income inequality may prompt a monopolist to switch from a mass-market to a niche posture. We explore this idea with the following simple example.
Example 4. A consumer's willingness-to-pay satisfies θ = ωy, where ω is his taste for the product and y is his income. Incomes and tastes are independent, with distributions satisfying
The monopolist, with a constant marginal cost of
Hence σ 2 indexes income inequality, and valuations are drawn from a log-normal distribution,
with a median of exp(µ 1 (σ) + µ 2 ( √ s 2 − σ 2 )), and mean E[θ] = exp(µ 1 (σ) + µ 2 ( √ s 2 − σ 2 ) + s 2 /2). The choice of κ boils down to choosing the dispersion of valuations, subject to
30 Writing Φ(·) for the distribution function of the standard normal,
30 By inspection, changes in s lead to a family of distributions ordered by a sequence of local rotations.
We identify two special cases. First, we set µ 1 (σ) + µ 2 (κ) = µ, for some constant µ. Thus, an increase in s, stemming from increased income-inequality or variation in tastes, will preserve the median. By inspection, P s (z) is quasi-convex in s; Proposition 1 applies, and hence the monopolist will choose s ∈ {s L , s H }, or equivalently κ ∈ {κ L , κ H }. For the second case, we insist that changes in σ and κ preserve the means E[y] = exp(µ 1 (σ) + σ 2 /2) and E[ω] = exp(µ 2 (κ) + κ 2 /2); we set µ 1 (σ) = −σ 2 /2 and µ 2 (κ) = µ − κ 2 /2. 31 Hence,
By inspection, P s (z) is a quasi-concave function of s, and hence Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 cannot be applied. 32 Nevertheless, Proposition 1 employs conditions sufficient for the quasiconvexity of profits; they are not necessary conditions. Following the logic of Section 2.3, profits will be quasi-convex so long as there is somes such that (s −s)(z † s − z * s ) > 0 for all s =s; as s increases, z * s crosses z † s once, and from above. Within the context of Example 4, the following lemma determines when this is true.
Lemma 2. For the specification of Example 4, suppose that increases in income inequality and the variability of tastes are mean-preserving, so that E[θ] = exp(µ) for some µ, and set s 2 = σ 2 + κ 2 . Profits are quasi-convex in s for s <s and quasi-concave in s >s, wherē
H , then monopoly profits are quasi-convex in κ.
Thus, so long as the dispersion of willingness-to-pay is not too large, the conclusion of Proposition 1 continues to hold: the monopolist prefers the extremes of [κ L , κ H ]. 33 A microfoundation for changes in κ could be obtained via, for instance, the characteristics specification of Example 3. Here we observe that, subject to the restriction s <s, the introduction of a "background risk" in income does not overturn the monopolist's desire to choose design extremes. 34 Exogenous changes in the inequality of income (as indexed by σ) may, however, determine which design extreme is preferred. In particular, observe that an increase in σ increases both the upper bound s H and lower bound s L to the set S = [s L , s H ]. So long as income inequality and the maximum design idiosyncrasy κ H are not too great, π(s) is quasi-convex in s, and the sign of π(s H ) − π(s L ) is increasing in both of these bounds.
31 This ensures that mean income satisfies E[y] = 1; this is a normalization. 32 It is straightforward to confirm that z † s = 1 − Φ(s), which is strictly decreasing in s. 33 To understand what it means to say that "the dispersion of willingness-to-pay is not too large," note that the upper limit of s =s corresponds to a Gini coefficient of approximately 0.487. 34 We can relate this observation to the work of Ross (1981) , Kihlstrom, Romer, and Williams (1981) , Nachman (1982) and Jewitt (1987) , who investigated when the comparative statics of risk aversion are preserved following the introduction of a background risk. Notice that a rotation of the distribution of θ is equivalent to a rotation of the distribution of log θ. In turn, log θ is the sum of independent random variables with log-concave densities. Following Jewitt (1987) , if two distributions of the taste parameter ω differ by a rotation, then this ranking will be preserved following the introduction of income variation. An increase in background risk might also correspond to an increase in the variability of consumers' outside options.
Proposition 6. For Example 4, if either (i) increases in κ and σ are median preserving, or (ii) the conditions of Lemma 2 hold, then the monopolist will choose κ ∈ {κ L , κ H }. There existsσ such that the monopolist will choose κ = κ H for σ >σ and κ = κ L for σ <σ.
Thus an increase in income inequality may prompt a monopolist to switch from a mass market to a niche posture. From a product-design perspective, we would expect the monopolist's product to offer something for everyone when consumer incomes are relatively homogeneous, and to pander to the highest extreme when there is wider income inequality.
Advertising and Information Provision
In Section 3 changes in the income distribution as well as product design and development decisions resulted in a family of valuation distributions indexed by riskiness. Here, we provide a different microfoundation for our core theory of rotations developed in Section 2. Specifically, we ask how the monopolist's advertising, sales, and marketing activities might influence the shape of demand that she faces. We identify two different functions of such activities: First, they may involve promotional hype, which highlights the existence of a product, shifting the demand curve outward. Second, they may involve the provision of real information, which often rotates the demand curve.
While we focus primarily on advertising, our analysis is applicable to many situations in which the real information available to consumers may be influenced. For example, the sponsorship of product reviews and demonstrations, the employment of knowledgeable and honest sales staff, return policies, or the provision of opportunities for consumers to otherwise sample or "test drive" may all increase the precision of real information. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 4.5 below, the introduction of novel product designs and styles may serve to reduce the precision of real information.
Hype versus Real Information in Advertising.
Traditionally, studies of advertising and their textbook counterparts have defined two main categories of advertising: Advertisements that are persuasive and those that are informative. 35, 36 According to this 35 In his recent survey Bagwell (2003) used these categories to classify contributions to the advertising literature. In one such contribution, Nelson (1975, p. 213 ) offered the following summary: "Why does advertising increase the sales of a brand that advertises? Two answers to this question have been provided in the literature. There are those who feel that advertising operates predominantly by changing consumer tastes. Others focus on advertising's information function." Bagwell (2003) also considered a third category of advertising, augmenting the persuasive and informative roles with the "complementary view" of advertising. Following Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1993) , supplies of this third type of advertising are complementary to the good being sold, and hence prompt an increase in demand. 36 We are also omitting any strategic or dynamic issues by using this categories. For instance, Nelson (1974) , Shapiro (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) viewed advertising as a signal of a product's quality. Furthermore, we do not explore the interplay between advertising and market structure, a topic that attracted many studies following the contributions of Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1971) .
taxonomy, advertising is persuasive if it increases each given consumer's willingness-to-pay for a product, while it is informative if it allows previously ignorant consumers to learn of a product's existence. While conceptually distinct, from a monopolist's perspective there is little qualitative difference between informative and persuasive advertisements: Both serve to shift demand outwards, and so can only increase sales at each possible price.
37
The assumption that advertising will always increase sales is restrictive. More generally, advertising, sales advice, and marketing may allow consumers privately to learn of their personal match with a product, and hence their true valuation for it. This need not always increase demand, as some consumers will learn that the product is not suited to their tastes even as others realize that it is. For instance, when an automobile manufacturer advertises the sporty nature of her product, this may dissuade consumers who seek a comfortable ride.
38
In response to these observations, we suggest a different taxonomy: An advertisement consists of both hype and real information. The hype in an advertisement corresponds to basic publicity for the product; a consumer might learn of the product's existence, price, availability, and any objective quality. 39 Absent other issues, hype will always increase the demand for the product. In contrast, the real information in an advertisement improves the ability of consumers to evaluate their subjective preferences for a product, as when it emphasizes the sporty nature of an automobile. 40 We show that real information increases the dispersion of consumers' valuations, and hence rotates the product's demand curve.
This taxonomy suggests a two-step decision problem for the monopolist as she formulates her advertising campaign. For the first step, she must decide on the size of the campaign. An increase in the campaign size might involve the purchase of additional advertising space in newspapers, or a rise in the frequency of radio and television commercials. This will entail increased expenditure: Hype is costly. For the second step, the monopolist must also choose the real-information content of her advertising, where such information pertains to a consumer's personal match with the product. In many scenarios, whatever decisions are made at this second step will have few significant cost implications, and henceforth we omit any considerations of cost in the increased provision of real information.
Under our classification, any advertisement necessarily contains elements of hype, but can contain varying levels of real information. When an informative advertisement tells (or 37 If, following Dixit and Norman (1978) , Shapiro (1980) , and Grossman and Shapiro (1984) , we were to analyze welfare, then the distinction would return. This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. 38 This example was considered by Johnson (2003) in his study of entry-level products with consumer learning. 39 An "objective quality" is a product feature that is valued by every consumer. For instance, an automobile manufacturer may advertise unambiguously valuable characteristics such as reliability and fuel economy. 40 Our emphasis on real-information content reflects concerns expressed the advertising and marketing literature. For instance, in their analysis of the information content of television advertising, Resnik and Stern (1977, p. 50) suggested that "in order for a commericial to be considered informative, it must permit a typical viewer to make a more intelligent buying decision after seeing the commercial than before seeing it." reminds) consumers only of the existence of a product, it is pure hype, and consumers learn little, if anything, of their personal match with the product's characteristics. 41 Relating this to Dorfman and Steiner's (1954, p. 826 ) description of advertising as an expenditure which "influences the shape or position of a firm's demand curve," we see that the traditional notions of either informative or persuasive advertising correspond operationally to what we call pure hype, and change the position of a firm's demand curve, whereas what we call real information rotates demand, thereby changing its shape.
Our view is that the existing advertising literature, stemming from the classic contributions of Stigler (1961) and Butters (1977) , helps us to understand the phenomenon of hype. In contrast, the idea that advertising may enable consumers to learn about their taste for a product has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. A notable exception is the contribution of Lewis and Sappington (1994) . 42 They note that "suppliers often have
considerable control over what is known about their products . . . a supplier can help inform buyers about the uses and potential profitability of purchasing her goods and services." In contrast, Ottaviani and Prat (2001) expanded upon the work of Milgrom and Weber (1982) by considering the incentive for a monopolist to commit to the public revelation of information, while authors such as Persico (2000) have considered the incentives for the responding decision maker (in this case, a consumer) to acquire additional information.
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41 A number of authors have assessed empirically the real information content of advertisements. Resnik and Stern (1977) and Stern, Resnik, and Grubb (1977) introduced a range of fourteen "evaluative criteria" that reflect useful information in a television commercial. These criteria include the communication of quality, product components, taste and packaging. These authors and their followers (Dowling 1980 , Renforth and Raveed 1983 , Senstrup 1985 , Weinberger and Spotts 1989 , and others) viewed a commercial as "informative" if it met one or more of the fourteen criteria; a low hurdle. Nevertheless, these studies found that an extremely large fraction of advertisements were uninformative. For instance, Stern and Resnik (1991) found that, among a sample of 462 US television commericials broadcast in Oregon in 1986, only 51.2% were informative. The proportion of completely uninformative advertisement drops dramatically in related studies of print advertisements (Laczniak 1979 , Taylor 1983 , Madden, Caballero, and Matsukubo 1986 . Nevertheless, we conclude that "pure hype" advertising is an established phenomenon. 42 There are, of course, other related contributions that highlight the implications giving an agent access to improved private information. For instance, Sobel (1993) considered a principal's preferences when an agent is either informed or uniformed (interim situations were not considered) in a contracting problem. Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998) modified the Baron and Myerson (1982) regulation model so that the agent must pay a cost to acquire his private information. They investigated the principal's incentive to influence the agent's information-acquisition decision. Anderson and Renault (2002) considered consumer search for products with random match value. Although consumers always learn their true match before buying, the existence of search costs and the possibility of hold-up by a firm causes advertising that provides either match-specific information or price-specific information to be optimal in different cases. 43 In the closing sentence of their paper, Ottaviani and Prat (2001) stated that " [in] contrast to the case of public information, no general principle has yet emerged on the value of private information in monopoly." We suggest that a robust economic principle emerges from the analysis of this paper. Specifically: An increase in private information results in increased dispersion of consumer valuations, which correponds to a rotation of the demand curve. When such rotations satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1 (as many do) the monopolist prefers the extremes, reaffirming the "all or nothing" insight of Lewis and Sappington (1994) .
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, we construct two examples of consumer learning. The first is based upon a setting of Lewis and Sappington (1994) , in which information provided by a monopolist takes a particular form which we refer to as "truth or noise." We begin our analysis below by reviewing this specification, and showing how it yields a (mean-preserving) rotation of the inverse-demand curve faced by a monopolist. We then consider a second, richer, example which also emphasizes how providing more information to consumers leads to a rotation of demand, and furthermore incorporates issues of risk aversion and the idiosyncrasy of product design. Having thus provided a microfoundation for our earlier core analysis of rotations in Section 2, we then pursue several applications of our theory of advertising.
Truth or Noise.
To formalize the notion that advertising may help consumers to learn, we separate a consumer's valuation (or willingness-to-pay) from his true payoff. Formally, a consumer's true taste is determined by some (unknown) parameter ω. Prior to making his purchase decision, the consumer may observe some informative signal x of ω. We will refer to x as an advertisement. However, x may represent the outcome from any other sales or marketing activity. For instance, x may be the outcome from the consumer's inspection of a product sample. Lewis and Sappington's (1994) specification is obtained when the advertisement x represents truth or noise about ω.
Example 5. A risk-neutral consumer's true (monetary) payoff ω is drawn from the distribution G(ω), forming his prior. He observes an advertisement x, but not ω. With probability s ∈ [s L , s H ] ⊆ [0, 1], x = ω. With probability 1 − s, x is an independent draw from G(x).
Under this specification, the advertisement x perfectly reveals the consumer's true preference with probability s, but is otherwise noise. The parameter s represents the accuracy of the information source: If s = 1, then x is perfectly revealing, whereas if s = 0, then it is pure noise. It is straightforward to observe that G(x) represents the marginal distribution of the advertisement x, as well as the marginal distribution (and hence prior) of the consumer's preference ω. Upon receipt of the advertisement x, a consumer is unable to distinguish between truth or noise. Bayesian updating, she obtains the posterior expectation
If s = 0, so that the advertisement is always noise, the consumer retains his prior expected valuation of E[ω]. If s > 0, then his posterior expectation is strictly increasing in x. If the monopolist sells z units at a common price, then she will sell to all consumers receiving an advertisement greater than x = G −1 (1 − z). This requires her to set a price P s (z) satisfying
Observe that this is linear, and hence convex, in the accuracy parameter s. Applying Lemma 1, the conditions of Propostion 1 are satisfied. In fact, π(s) = max z {zP s (z) − C(z)} is the maximum of convex functions, and is itself convex. This is stronger than the quasiconvexity implied by Proposition 1.
Proposition 7. For Example 5, profits are convex in s and maximized by s ∈ {s L , s H }.
In 
This analysis, in essence, replicates Propositions 1 and 2 from Lewis and Sappington (1994) .
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Our approach, however, differs from theirs, and illustrates the simple economics of the result: An increase in the supply of real information increases the dispersion of the distribution of posterior expectations, and hence rotates the demand curved faced by the monopolist.
Example 5 has limitations. First, the truth or noise specification is extreme, although its tractability helps to illustrate key ideas in a clean fashion. Second, the demand rotations generated by changes in s are special in that there is a constant rotation point:
so that the inverse-demand curve P s (z) rotates around the mean E[ω]. More general examples may exhibit rotation points that change with s. Third, increases in s do not change the mean of the valuation distribution. This follows from the assumption of risk neutrality. If consumers are risk averse, then an increase in s will reduce the risk premium paid by a consumer who is uncertain of her preference for it. A reduction in risk premia will increase the willingness-to-pay of all consumers. Hence, any rotation of demand will be accompanied by a shift. We might expect this to yield a moving rotation point.
4.3. Advertising and Risk Aversion. To address the limitations discussed above, we move to a second example. We allow for risk aversion on the part of the consumer, as well as a system of advertising that is less extreme than the "all or nothing" features of Example 5.
Example 6. The prior distribution of a risk-averse consumer's true (monetary) utility satisfies ω ∼ N (µ, κ 2 ). He observes an advertisement x, but not ω. Conditional on ω,
x ∼ N (ω, ξ 2 ). His preferences exhibit constant absolute risk-aversion, with coefficient λ.
For this example, the variance κ 2 indexes the dispersion of true consumer payoffs. Our interpretation is that this represents idiosyncrasy in the product's design. 45 When κ 2 is small, all consumers value the product in a similar way-a "plain vanilla" design. In contrast, when κ 2 is large, true payoffs are more variable-a "love it or hate it" design. The second key parameter is ξ 2 , indexing the noise in the advertising signal. An alternative representation is to write ψ = 1/ξ 2 for the precision of any real information provided to consumers.
The normal-CARA combination is widely used in many fields of economics, and leads to tractable results. 46 Given the receipt of an advertisement x, a consumer Bayesian updates his beliefs to obtain posterior beliefs over ω. Standard calculations confirm that his willingnessto-pay for the product will be the certainty equivalent θ(x) satisfying
This valuation is a weighted average of the ex ante certainty equivalent (µ − λκ 2 /2) and the ex post advertisement realization (x). In the usual way, the weights depend upon the relative precision of the prior (1/κ 2 ) and the signal (ψ).
To characterize the demand curve faced by the monopolist, we must consider the distribution of θ. From the perspective of the monopolist, realized advertisements follow the distribution x ∼ N (µ, κ 2 + ξ 2 ). Consumer valuations are an affine function of x, and hence satisfy
For any choice of κ 2 and ψ, the distribution remains within the normal family. Thus, changes in either parameter yield a family ordered by a sequence of mean-variance shifts:
where the inverse-demand curve is now indexed by both κ 2 and ψ, rather than a single dispersion parameter s. Notice that the standard deviation ψκ 4 /(1 + ψκ 2 ) is increasing in κ 2 and ψ: The valuations distribution is riskier when the product design is more idiosyncratic (an increase in κ 2 ) or when advertising is more informative (an increase in ψ).
45 A further microfoundation may be obtained via the Lancastrian specification of Example 3. 46 For instance, Ackerberg's (2003) empirical examination of advertising, learning, and consumer choice followed Erdem and Keane (1996) by using a normal specification for consumer learning. The normal-CARA specification is also central to the "career concerns" literature sparked by Holmström (1982) . An implication of our results (including Propositions 7 and 8) is that the monopolist prefers extremes when consumers have access to real information. Interestingly, this conclusion also emerges from analyses of learning within organizations. For instance, Meyer (1994) considered task assignment in a team-production setting, and its implications for learning about agents' abilities. She found (pp. 1171-75) that the principal prefers tasks to be either completely shared, or completeley specialized; there is no interior solution.
In contrast to Example 5, and so long as λ > 0, the mean valuation is not invariant to κ 2 and ψ. Fixing ψ, E[θ] is decreasing in κ 2 ; for a more idiosyncratic product, a purchase represents more of a gamble. This is reflected by a higher risk premium, and the increase in variance is accompanied by an inward shift of the inverse-demand curve. Fixing κ 2 , an increase in ψ increases E[θ]; more informative advertising reduces the risk premium, and hence the rotation is accompanied by an outward demand shift. Thus increases in κ 2 and ψ influence the shape of demand in the same way, but shift the mean in opposite directions.
These properties ensure that the quantity around which the demand curve rotates will not be constant. Nevertheless, Propositions 1 and 2 admit such possibilities. Proposition 8 confirms that the monopolist will wish to choose extreme values for her product-design idiosyncrasy and the precision of information. We write π(κ 2 , ψ) for the monopolist's profits as a function of these parameters. Further, we suppose that
Proposition 8. For Example 6, π(κ 2 , ψ) is quasi-convex in κ 2 and in ψ. Furthermore,
If λ = 0 then these implications also hold with the reverse inequalities: With risk-neutral consumers, profits are increasing in κ 2 if and only if they are increasing in ψ.
Proposition 8 implies that the monopolist will choose, if she is able to do so, κ 2 ∈ {κ 2 L , κ 2 H } and ψ ∈ {ψ L , ψ H }: An "all or nothing" approach to design idiosyncrasy and real-information provision. Furthermore, she will never choose κ 2 = κ 2 H together with ψ = ψ L . To see why, notice that an increase in κ 2 increases the variance of the valuation distribution, while reducing the mean. Increasing ψ can achieve a similar increase in variance, while increasing the mean. Hence increases in κ 2 will always be accompanied by increases in ψ: More idiosyncratic products are complemented by detailed advertising and marketing activities.
When consumers are risk neutral, the inverse demand curve reduces to P κ 2 ,ψ (z) = µ + sP (z), where s = ψκ 4 /(1 + ψκ 2 ). The monopolist's desire to choose extreme values for s manifests itself as the pairing of κ 2 L with ψ L or of κ 2 H with ψ H : The monopolist will never engage in highly informative advertising of a plain-vanilla product.
When consumers are risk averse, the situation is subtly different. It is possible that the monopolist may pair detailed advertising (ψ H ) with a vanillla product (κ 2 L ). To see why, recall that increases in κ 2 and ψ shape demand in different ways; the demand curve rotates around different points. In a slight abuse of notation, we write z † κ 2 for the quantity satisfying ∂P κ 2 ,ψ (z † κ 2 )/∂κ 2 = 0, and similarly for z † ψ . Based on our earlier analysis, z †
47 If the monopoly supply satisfies z † κ 2 < z * < z † ψ , then profits will be locally increasing in ψ, and yet decreasing in κ 2 : More detailed advertising of a less idiosyncratic product is desirable.
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This discussion, driven by a possible tension between design idiosyncrasy and real information, reveals that families of distributions may be rotation-ordered and yet violate the monotone-rotation-point assumption of Proposition 1. For such cases, it may be (but need not be) that profits are not quasi-convex. In particular, suppose that initial increases in a dispersion parameter s primarily serve to increase ψ, but further increases primarily increase κ 2 . 49 Then, since the point at which the demand rotates is moving from a higher quantity to a lower quantity, in some region of prices it may be that the demand curve is first pushed out (from an increase in ψ) and then pulled back (from an increase in κ 2 ). If the monopolist were pricing in that region (as she may be) profits might first increase, but then decrease.
It follows that there is no fully general result that all rotation-ordered families of distributions must induce quasi-convex profits. 50 Nonetheless, inasmuch as the firm can independently control both product idiosyncrasy (κ 2 ) and real information (ψ), the firm always prefers extreme values for each, although which extreme value is preferred (low or high) may (occasionally, and not when the consumer is risk neutral) differ.
4.4.
Advertising Life-Cycles. We now return to the idea that advertising potentially may contain elements of both hype and real information. To begin, suppose that the monopolist controls only hype, so that in formulating her advertising policy she decides only how many consumers will become aware of her product. Given that a consumer is aware, however, the precision of information available to him is fixed at some level s. This is appropriate when the exact nature of an advertisement cannot be controlled, or when a product-aware consumer is able to learn of the product's characteristics from a third-party source. It is natural to assume that it is costly to reach more consumers with the message of existence, and so we suppose that there is an increasing marginal cost of reaching additional consumers.
As we know from our earlier discussion, increasing the number of informed consumers (while fixing s) corresponds to a simple outward shift in demand, and can only raise profits. Nonetheless, since such advertising is costly, we see immediately that the incentives for such expenditures depend on the precision of real information available to consumers. That straightforward algebraic manipulation confirms that
By inspection, these rotation quantities are increasing in both κ 2 and ψ 2 . 48 As λ → 0, these two different rotation quantities converge to 1 2 , and this possibility is eliminated. 49 Fuller details of this argument are provided in Appendix A. 50 Similarly, there is no general result relating Blackwell (1953) ordered advertising-signal distributions to quasi-convexity of payoffs. Lewis and Sappington (1994) provided a counterexample, which, utilizing the insights of our approach, can be seen to also involve an increasing rotation point θ † s , or equivalently, a decreasing rotation quantity z † s .
is, hype influences the size of the consumer base, but as seen from our examples above, the expected profit from each product-aware consumer is quasi-convex in real information s. We conclude that the incentives to hype a product are greatest when the precision of real information available to consumers is either very low or very high.
The precision of real information, and hence the dispersion of willingness-to-pay, may well change over time even when advertising is pure hype. For instance, information pertaining to product characteristics (and hence subjective valuations) might be passed by word-of-mouth, or via product reviews.
51 When this is so, the intensity of the monopolist's hype will not be constant over time. Rather, we expect the "advertising life-cycle" of a product to itself be U-shaped. Early on, consumers possess little information, and the monopolist engages in significant hype to make consumers aware of her product. Then, as consumers gain access to better real information, the intensity of advertising falls. Eventually, however, advertising increases as the product becomes mature.
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Now we suppose the monopolist may influence the precision of consumers' beliefs, by changing the real-information content of advertising and marketing activities. In particular, she is able to augment any exogenous information by providing additional real content in her advertisements, but she cannot choose a final precision of real information beneath that which is exogenously available. From this, a richer view of the role of advertising emerges. Figure 4 (a) illustrates. Initially, the level of information available to consumers is s L , and the profit per product-aware consumer is quite high, given by π(s L ). While there are strong incentives to promote the product's existence, the monopolist has no incentives to provide additional real information and hence does not. Consequently, her advertising campaign is pure hype. As exogenous information evolves from s L to s M , the monopolist continues to eschew augmenting it, and advertising profile remains pure hype even as the intensity of her campaign, and the expected profit per consumer, falls. Past s M , however, the situation may change, as the monopolist would prefer consumers to have information s H rather than any value s ∈ (s M , s H ). Consequently, the advertising mix will change to incorporate more real information. This pushes the final precision of information further to the right. Eventually, the monopolist will again increase the overall intensity of her advertising, and also provide as much additional real information as possible. In the end, a transformation of the nature 51 In empirical work, Ackerberg (2003 Ackerberg ( , p. 1011 recognized that "if consumers obtain idiosyncratic information from consumption, we might expect prior experience and the resulting accumulation of information to generate relatively higher variance (across consumers) in experienced consumers' behaviors (e.g., some consumers finds out they like the brand, some find out they do not)." Ackerberg (2001) offered examined whether advertising provides information, or achieves its effects via other avenues such as prestige. 52 We are implicitly assuming that, in each period, the monopolist faces a different group of consumers who have yet to learn their true valuations, as might be the case if they had purchased the good in the past. One case in which this may be is when the good is durable and marginal purchases are by first-time buyers. 
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In the example of Figure 4 (a), π(s L ) > π(s H ), so that a low precision of real information is preferred. This raises the question of whether there are ways for the monopolist to destroy the information exogenously available to consumers. 54 While this may be impossible for a given product, it does highlight an incentive to replace an existing product with an entirely new one. Doing so may well destroy the information available to consumers. This suggests that our study of product design and development in Section 3 might be expanded to incorporate situations in which consumers are uncertain of their true valuations for product.
4.5. New Product Introductions. We now pursue this idea that the decision to introduce a new product may have informational consequences. Our starting point is this observation, 53 In our discussion we have been implicitly assuming that the monopoly profits are in fact strictly U-shaped. However, we only know that they are quasiconvex, so that they possibly may be monotone increasing or decreasing. Our arguments above are easily adapted to handle such circumstances. 54 More accurately, the monopolist wishes to prevent consumers from acting upon such information. This idea underpinned DeGraba's (1995) model of buying frenzies; by selling fewer units, the monopolist creates excess demand. Thus consumers who delay purchase, hence acquiring real information, will find no units available. A similar mechanism prompts a monopolist to sell rather than lease in Biehl (2001) .
and also the observation that firms frequently are faced with the decision of whether to continue selling an existing product or to replace it with one of improved quality. By improved quality we mean that, fixing the precision of information available, the demand curve associated with the new product is an outward shift of that associated with the existing product. We fix the number of consumers who will be aware of the existence of either product, and suppose that the real information available to consumers related to the current product is fixed at s 1 . The only way the monopolist can influence the information available to consumers is by introducing a new product in place of the existing one. If the new product is introduced, consumers have some stock of information s 2 < s 1 so that, as explained above, introducing a new product leads to the destruction of some information.
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When will the monopolist replace her existing product with a new one? To answer this, we observe that the change in profits can be decomposed into two effects. The first is an increase in profits resulting from improved quality, given the original precision of information s 1 , while the second is a change (either positive or negative) resulting from the fall in the precision from s 1 to s 2 , at the new quality level. Figure 4 (b) illustrates a particular example.
Therefore, assuming that the profit function for each product is quasi-convex in s (as it would be in a variety of circumstances as shown earlier), the monopolist faces the greatest informational cost (if indeed there is a cost, since the monopolist may wish to destroy information) when s 1 is large, fixing s 2 . Heuristically, the monopolist is hurt the most by the depletion of the informational stock because profits are highest at the extremes s L and s H . If we associate larger values of s 1 with firms that have established a meaningful brand image that conveys important information to potential consumers, we conclude that firms with such images will be more hesitant to innovate if so doing threatens their brand image. Thus, the presence of these informational costs means the monopolist may not introduce a new product even though it raises consumers' true payoffs.
We might also ask how the new information level s 2 influences new product introduction, this time taking s 1 as given. Heuristically we see that when s 2 is at either a high or a low extreme, a firm is more likely to introduce a new product. That is, if s 2 is quite high (s 2 > s 2 in Figure 4 (b)) then there is no real informational cost and the firm should proceed with the product of higher quality. Similarly, if s 2 is very low (s 2 < s 2 ), then while significant information is destroyed, s 2 is at least close to the lower extreme s L , and the monopolist will tend to favor a new product. For more moderate information destruction (s 2 < s 2 < s 2 ), however, the response to product-innovation opportunities will be sluggish.
This discussion suggests that when these informational issues are significant the monopolist would benefit from taking steps to either curb or enhance the destruction of information associated with a new product's introduction. In reality, such steps are available. One manner in which a firm may preserve information is by designing new products to share similar features as old products, and by promoting the new product in such a way that consumers are aware of this. Thus the monopolist might specialize in certain styles of products, and emphasize the similarities between them by using the same brand names for different products developed over time.
56 On the other hand, when destroying information is beneficial, the monopolist will wish to perform extensive style changes and emphasize such changes by, for example, using different product or brand names. Finally, we note that when s 2 is controlled by the monopolist, then she will always innovate.
Product Lines
In Section 2, the monopolist sold only a single product. Here we analyze a multiproduct monopolist, selling a range of quality-differentiated goods, and explore the relationship between her product line and the dispersion of the consumer-type distribution.
The section is organized as follows. We first construct a standard model of quality-based price-discrimination, following Mussa and Rosen (1978) . Rather than employing the contracttheoretic analysis of Maskin and Riley (1984) , we use Johnson and Myatt's (2003b, 2003a) "upgrades approach" to obtain our results. This approach re-casts multiproduct supply decisions so that one works not with the actual physical products, but instead in terms of upgrades from one quality to the next. As we show just below, the product line may be characterized by the usual "MR = MC" first-order condition of a single-product monopolist. Applying this technique, we ask how the monopolist's price-discrimination opportunities and technological capability influence her desire to choose mass-market versus niche positions. We then characterize the transformation of the product line following an increase in the dispersion of consumers, before reviewing an example that illustrates our results.
5.1. The Upgrades Approach to Product Line Design. The monopolist is able to offer n distinct product qualities, where the quality of product i is q i , and 0 < q 1 < · · · < q n . A consumer's type θ is her willingness-to-pay for a single unit of quality. Thus, if a type θ consumes quality q at price p, he receives a net payoff of θq − p. Faced with a set of prices 56 The automobile manufacturer Jaguar recently introduced a new XJ-series luxury sedan. The engineering of the new XJ is advanced in that it makes extensive use of lightweight construction materials; however, its styling closely resembles the XJ sedan of 30 years earlier. In a newspaper review article, Frankel (2003) commented that, "Cautiously styled to resemble an expanded version of the old XJ, it appears too keen not to offend those who have made sure Jaguar has sold more XJs over 35 years than every other model put together . . . [but] contrary to appearances, the XJ is the most radical big saloon on the market."
{p i }, a consumer purchases a single unit of the product that maximizes θq i − p i , unless doing so yields a negative payoff, in which case he purchases nothing.
The monopolist sets quantities for each of her n products. As in Section 2, we write P (z) for the type θ with a mass z of others above him. This corresponds to the inverse demand curve for a single product of quality q = 1, and is the basis for the entire system of inverse demand. We write {z i } for the supplies of the n qualities. For the market to clear, the individual with n j=1 z j others above him must be just indifferent between purchasing quality q 1 and not purchasing at all. We define the cumulative variables {Z i } to satisfy Z i = n j=i z j . With this notation, p 1 = q 1 P (Z 1 ). Thus, the consumer of type θ = P (Z 1 ) is just willing to buy product 1. Similarly, a consumer with Z i others above him must be just indifferent between products i and i − 1, so that
Following Johnson and Myatt (2003b, 2003a) , we offer the following interpretation. ∆p i represents the price of an "upgrade" from quality q i−1 to the next quality q i . Thus, we can view the monopolist as supplying Z 1 units of a "baseline" product of quality q 1 , at a price of p 1 . She then supplies successive upgrades to this baseline product in order to achieve qualities above this. So, a product of quality q 2 consists of a baseline product at a price of p 1 , bundled together with an upgrade ∆q 2 priced at ∆p 2 . Similarly, a product of quality q 3 consists of quality q 2 bundled together with an upgrade ∆q 3 priced at ∆p 3 .
On the cost side, the monopolist manufactures quality q i at a constant marginal cost of c i . The profit of the monopolist can be determined given that she has chosen a profile of upgrade supplies {Z i }, where Z i ≥ Z i+1 is required for this profile to be feasible (since
We impose two simplifying conditions. 57 First, quality-adjusted marginal revenue MR s (z) = P s (z) + zP s (z) is decreasing in z for all s. Second, there are decreasing returns to quality:
This holds, for instance, whenever c i = c(q i ) and c(q) is convex in q. Here, the primary effect of this assumption is that it implies that a monopolist will not offer a product line that exhibits "gaps." That is, if products i and k > i are optimally in positive supply then so is any product j with i ≤ j ≤ k. We can see this by examining the unconstrained supply Z * i that maximizes profits in upgrade market i, or
Since marginal revenue is decreasing, we can employ the usual first-order condition, equating marginal cost to marginal revenue where possible, to characterize Z * i . In fact,
so long as marginal revenue crosses ∆c i /∆q i ; otherwise the optimal (unconstrained) upgrade output in market i is either zero or one. Now, given this, and the fact that the right-hand side is strictly increasing in i, Z * i must be decreasing. It is strictly decreasing whenever we have an interior solution:
. Since the monotonicity constraint Z i ≥ Z i+1 on upgrade supplies is satisfied, the set of upgrade supplies that maximize profits in each upgrade market independently also solves the monopolist's multiproduct maximization problem incorporating the appropriate monotonicity constraints. Moreover, as claimed, there clearly can be no gaps in the product line of the firm.
Note that, when an interior solution maximizes π i , the equalization of marginal revenue and (quality-adjusted) marginal cost in the upgrade market reveals the simple economics of second-degree price discrimination: It corresponds to the usual monopoly solution in the space of upgrade supplies, rather than the supplies of the products themselves.
Product Lines and Distribution
Families. Consider a family of type distributions {F s (θ)}, with associated inverse-demand functions {P s (z)}. Exactly as above,
We let Z * is denote the optimal level of upgrade i given s.
From our work in Section 2 we know that the profits of a monopolist selling a single product are either quasi-convex or convex in s. Similar results hold for a multiproduct monopolist.
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Proposition 9. If P s (z) is a convex function of s for each z ∈ [0, 1], then the profits π(s) of a multiproduct monopolist are convex in s, and max s∈S π(s) ∈ {π(s L ), π(s H )}. Hence, if the family of distributions {F s (θ)} is ordered by a sequence of local mean-variance shifts, so that F s (θ) = F ((θ − µ(s))/s), and the mean µ(s) is convex, then π(s) is convex.
The intuition behind Proposition 9 is somewhat more complicated than when there is but a single product. To better understand it, note that we may divide the monopolist's upgrades into two subsets for any fixed s. For discussion purposes, we specialize to the case of meanvariance shifts, and recall that z † s is the quantity around which the (now quality-normalized) inverse-demand rotates for a local change in s. Suppose that, for some i,
Hence, for all upgrades j ≥ i, optimal supply is below the rotation quantity z † s , and for all upgrades j < i supply is above z † s . Profits are the sum of two components:
The "mass-market upgrades," which include the baseline product q 1 , have optimal supplies serving the mass market. A local increase in s will reduce the profitability of such upgrades. In contrast, the supplies of "niche upgrades," which include supply of the upgrade to the maximum-feasible quality q n , are restricted to a niche market. The profitability of them is increasing in s. Thus, the two sets of upgrades present a tension for the monopolist: A mass-market posture is optimal for some, while a niche posture is optimal for the remainder. That is, increasing s raises the profits in some upgrade markets but lowers it in others.
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It is now easy to explain why, unlike in the case of a single product (Proposition 1), quasiconvexity of P s (z) in s is insufficient to guarantee quasi-convexity of profits, and yet when P s (z) is convex in s, profits are convex in the multiproduct case just as they would be if there were a single product. The technical reason for the distinction is that, while a multiproduct monopolist who faces quasi-convex P s (z) does have quasi-convex profits in each upgrade market, there is no guarantee that the sum of the profits is quasi-convex, since the sum of quasi-convex functions need not be quasi-convex. More heuristically, if a local increase in s implied a slight increase in overall profits, mere quasi-convexity of π i for each i would not ensure that a further increase does not lead to a decrease in profits, destroying quasi-convexity of overall profits. The reason is that a further increase in s would (quite possibly) improve the profits associated with some upgrade markets while worsening the profits associated with others at arbitrary rates, so that more structure than quasi-convexity is required to ensure that the positive effects of heightened s continue to outweigh the negative effects.
The stronger condition of convexity of P s (z) resolves this issue, and moreover leads to the stronger conclusion that profits are convex in s.
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As noted above, if the monopolist is able to choose s, then subject to the conditions of Proposition 9, she will select either s L or s H . Following the intuition just outlined, however, this selection will depend upon the relative importance of the niche and mass-market upgrades. To investigate this tension further, suppose that, in fact, there are N potential qualities available, but that the monopolist is restricted to the production of qualities q n and below, where n < N . Suppose that, initially, ∆c n /∆q n < MR s (z † s ), so that the monopolist's product line consists entirely of mass-market upgrades. It follows that her incentive is to lower s. Suppose that the monopolist then innovates, and by doing so raises her technological capabilities. We can think of this an increase in n. If ∆c N /∆q N > MR s (z † s ), then for a sufficiently large innovation, ∆c n /∆q n > MR s (z † s ). The monopolist now has more niche upgrades in her portfolio. As n increases, her profits are increasingly biased towards a niche operation, in the sense that for a given s, the local change in profits from an increase in s is increasing. Moreover, under some mild technical conditions, increases in s make it more likely that the monopolist will choose s H over s L , if she is indeed able to make this choice. Let π(s, n) denote the optimized profits given s and given that the firm can produce up to quality q n .
Proposition 10. Suppose that the family of distributions is ordered by a sequence of meanvariance shifts, so that F s (θ) = F ((θ − µ(s))/s), with convex µ(s). If P s H (0) > ∆c N /∆q N , and n >ñ where
This says that as the monopolist becomes able to produce higher-quality products, she may alter her strategy regarding her choice of s. As n increases, both π(s H , n) and π(s L , n) increase, since the choice set expands, but higher levels of s become more attractive since π(s H , n) increases more quickly than π(s L , n). Heuristically, the reason is that, under the hypotheses above, the new upgrade will be sold as a niche upgrade for either s L or s H , and niche upgrades are more valuable under more disperse distributions of consumer willingnessto-pay (since marginal revenue is higher under s H than s L in the relevant range of quantity).
This line of thinking also reveals when the incentives to expend resources to so innovate are the greatest. Intuitively, under conditions similar to those in Proposition 10, as s is higher the incentive to invest in niche innovations is greater. Therefore, informally speaking, if we imagine that s is increasing exogenously over time as a result increased product-design idiosyncrasy, consumer learning about the product line, or an increase in the dispersion of consumer wealth (and willingness-to-pay), we would expect a monopolist to accelerate her pursuit of higher-quality products.
There are numerous further implications that follow immediately from Proposition 9. For example, much of the discussion in Sections 2-4 for single-product firms is readily applicable to the multiproduct setting, and we do not recapitulate here. On the other hand, the question of how the entire product-line is influenced by changes in s is necessarily not considered in the single-product setting, and so we turn now to that issue.
5.3. Product Line Transformations. We consider the implications of an increase in s, which would follow from an exogenous or endogenous increase in the dispersion of consumer valuations for quality, on the characteristics of the monopolist's product line. To sharpen our analysis, we restrict to a family of distribution functions {F s (θ)} that are ordered by a sequence of mean-variance shifts (Definition 2). From Proposition 2, we know that a local change in s will result in a rotation of the (quality-normalized) marginal revenue term For instance, suppose that there is some i such that
The supply of upgrades j ≥ i increases with s, and the supply of upgrades j < i decreases with s. We can relate this observation back to consider the distribution of qualities offered by a firm. Recall that Z * js is the total supply of all qualities q j and greater. Hence, setting Z 0 = 1 for convenience for all s, 1 − Z * js is the supply of qualities strictly below i. Thus, {1 − Z * js } may be used to characterize the distribution of qualities offered by the monopolist. Since 1 − Z * js is increasing in s, for j < i, and increasing for j > i, we observe that the cumulative distribution function of qualities supplied rotates as s increases. This argument leads to the following proposition, which also describes further possibilities.
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Proposition 11. Suppose that the family of distributions is ordered by a sequence of meanvariance shifts, so that F s (θ) = F ((θ − µ(s))/s), and that µ(s) is convex. Then,
, then a local increase in s yields a local rotation of the distribution of qualities offered by the monopolist, (2) if MR s (z ‡ s ) < ∆c 1 /∆q 1 then a local increase in s yields a first-order stochastic dominating shift up in the distribution of qualities offered by the monopolist, and 61 The three responses of the product line to s, as described in Proposition 11, fall within Hammond's (1974) notion of "simply related" distributions. Thus, if a local change in s results in two distributions of θ that are simply related, then the corresponding distributions of qualities supplied will also be simply related.
(3) if MR s (z ‡ s ) > ∆c n /∆q n then a local increase in s yields a first-order stochastic dominated shift down in the distribution of qualities offered by the monopolist.
As marginal revenue rotates, more upgrades are produced of those qualities with (qualityadjusted) marginal production costs above the rotation point of (quality-adjusted) marginal revenue, while fewer upgrades of other qualities are produced. When MR s (z ‡ s ) < ∆c 1 /∆q 1 , in the region of relevance marginal revenue is rising for each given upgrade quality and consequently Z * is is increasing for each i: For each given quality level, the total number of products of at least that quality increases. An implication is that more products in total are on the market. On the other hand, when MR s (z ‡ s ) > ∆c n /∆q n , in the region of relevance marginal revenue is falling for each given upgrade quantity and consequently Z * is is decreasing for each i: For each given quality level, the total number of products of at least that quality decreases. An implication of this is that fewer products in total are on the market. For the remaining case (statement (1) in the proposition) the total output produced at or above a particular quality level goes up or down, depending on the quality level in question.
Finally, it is important to note that in none of these cases can we typically make direct conclusions about the output of any particular quality itself. Instead, we predict changes in the overall volume either above or below certain quality levels. That is, we predict changes in the levels of the upgrades, but without additional structure one cannot say how the difference in upgrade levels z * is = Z * is − Z * (i+1)s (the supply of the actual product i) will change with s. The reason is that this depends on the relative slopes of marginal revenue at different quality-normalized cost levels, and these slopes are in no way tied down by the assumptions we have made. An exception is the highest quality product that is in positive supply. For this product i the supply of the complete product z * is is equal to the supply Z * is of upgrade i, since Z * (i+1)s = 0. z * is is then locally increasing or decreasing in s depending upon whether ∆c i /∆q i is above or below MR ‡ s . We now examine the boundaries of the monopolist's product line. Intuitively, we expect predictable changes to the lower and upper product ranges. In particular, we expect the monopolist to expand the set of qualities offered as s increases. To investigate this, we write q s and q s for the lowest and highest qualities offered.
Proposition 12. Suppose that the family of distributions is ordered by a sequence of meanvariance shifts, so that F s (θ) = F ((θ − µ(s))/s), and that µ(s) is convex. Then the monopolist's product range expands with s: q s is decreasing and q s is increasing.
One implication of this proposition is that a long product line complements actions that increase the dispersion of consumer willingness-to-pay. Moreover, extending the product line both on the low and the high quality ends may well accompany such increased dispersion. One concrete application is the evolution of a product line over time. about product characteristics, and if the overall market becomes better informed over time, the optimal strategy for a monopolist will be to begin with a focused product line, but to then expand it in both directions as information accumulates in the market.
Putting Propositions 11 and 12 together, we see that while the monopolist's product line always expands with s, whether this expanded range results in a larger or smaller total supply depends on the rotation point of marginal revenue. For example, suppose that the marginal cost of the baseline product is relatively low, so that MR ‡ s = MR s (z ‡ s ) > c 1 /q 1 . This implies that Z * 1s is locally decreasing in s. Thus, as the dispersion of types increases, the monopolist will serve less of the total market. However, she will do so using more products.
5.4. Illustration. To illustrate our results, we expand the single-product setting of Example 1 to include the possibility of a quality-differentiated multiproduct menu.
Example 7. Consumer types follow the specification of Example 1. The monopolist may produce any quality q ∈ [0, q]. If she is able to manufacture quality q, then the monopolist may do so by paying a constant marginal cost of c(q) = γq 1+α /(1 + α), where α, γ > 0.
Example 7 does not describe a discrete grid of available qualities, but instead allows the monopolist to choose from a continuum. Nevertheless, we may apply our analysis by specifying a grid of n qualities satisfying q n = q and q 0 = 0. For ∆q i sufficiently small, the quality-normalized marginal cost of upgrade i satisfies ∆c i /∆q i ≈ c (q i ) = γq Allowing n to grow large, we may consider the limiting case in which the monopolist sells a continuum of qualities. Omitting the details of this limiting operation, we write G s (q) for the distribution function over qualities for given s, and g s (q) for its corresponding density: It is also straightforward to obtain the upper and lower bounds to the product line: where the monopolist does in fact operate so long as µ + s > 0. For q sufficiently large (so that the monopolist is able to manufacture products of very high quality) the optimal product lines are illustrated in Figure 5 , for varying s. For lower s (for instance, s = 0.2) the lower bound of the product line is strictly above zero. As s increases, however, the upper and lower bounds to the product line move up and down, respectively, until the lower bound hits q = 0. Further increases in s prompt the monopolist to restrict her total output-as noted previously, she sells fewer units in total, but uses a longer product-line to do so.
Concluding Remarks
We have proposed a framework for analyzing both exogenous and endogenous transformations of the demand facing a firm. Our approach is based on the observation that changes in demand frequently correspond to changes in the dispersion of the underlying willingness-topay of consumers, which lead to a rotation of the demand curve. We investigated numerous applications of our framework, including product design and development decisions, advertising and marketing activities, and product line choices of multiproduct firms. The optimal advertising and product design depend, in turn, on the monopolist's desire to adopt either a mass-market or niche posture. We also suggested a new taxonomy of advertising, distinguishing between hype, which shifts demand, and real information, which rotates demand.
It has not escaped our attention that there are limitations to our analysis. Perhaps most importantly, we have considered only a single firm. Introducing more firms may engender strategic interactions, modifying our results and generating new ones. Nonetheless, because demand dispersion possibilities influence a multitude of choices that a firm makes, better understanding their role seems critical to a fuller appreciation of firm-level decision making. The steps taken here by us will be helpful in this regard. One reason is that there has been remarkably little prior study of this issue. A more important reason may be that, while our framework is broadly applicable, it is also very simple: Understanding the economics of demand rotations suffices to understand many phenomena from diverse areas of application.
Appendix A. Omitted Proofs
Propositions 1, 5, 7, 9, and 11 follow from arguments presented in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix θ and s , s ∈ S, where s < s . If statement (1) holds, then
Thus, if F s (θ) is weakly decreasing in s, then it also weakly decreasing for larger s. This means that F s (θ) is first decreasing, and then increasing, as s increases; it is not quasiconcave, and statement (3) must fail. Combining these observations, we have shown that statement (1) holds if and only if statement (3) holds. Very similar arguments confirm that these are also equivalent to statements (2) and (4).
Proof of Propostion 2. Profits satisfy π(s) = max z∈[0,1] {zP s (z)−C(z)}. Since P s (z) = µ(s)+ sP (z), and µ(s) is convex, P s (z) is the sum of convex functions and hence convex in s, as is zP s (z) − C(z). π(s) is then the maximum of convex functions, and is itself convex. We turn to statements (1)-(4). For a given z, the derivative of marginal revenue with respect to s is µ (s) + P (z) + zP (z). Decreasing marginal-revenue immediately reveals that there is some z ‡ s ∈ [0, 1] such that this derivative is positive if z < z ‡ s , and negative if z > z ‡ s . This represents a local rotation, establishing statement (1).
62 By inspection, marginal revenue is convex in s, yielding statement (2). The first part of statement (3), claiming that z ‡ s is increasing in s, and statement (4), follow from the logic used in the proof of Lemma 1. The second part of statement (3) Given CARA preferences, and the normality of posterior beliefs over ω, the consumer's willingness to pay will be the certainty equivalent E[ω | x] − λ var[ω | x]/2. Substituting in for the expectation and variance yields the expression for θ(x) given in the main text. With such preliminaries in hand, we may turn to the proposition itself. In a slight abuse of notation, let us write σ 2 for the variance of θ. Following some algebraic manipulation, P κ 2 ,ψ (z) = µ − λκ Let us fix κ 2 . By inspection P κ 2 ,ψ (z) is convex in s, and s in turn is increasing in ψ. Thus P κ 2 ,ψ (z) is quasi-convex in ψ. Hence profits are quasi-convex in ψ. Furthermore,
which, upon substitution of s, yields z † ψ in Footnote 47. Next, let us fix ψ. Differentiating, ∂P κ 2 ,ψ (z) ∂κ 2 = − λ 2 + [λs + P (z)] ∂s ∂κ 2 = 0 ⇔ z = z † κ 2 = Φ − λ 2(∂s/∂κ 2 ) + λs .
To assess the quasi-convexity of profits in κ 2 , we apply Proposition 1. Examining z † Inspection of this expression yields the remaining claims of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 10. Take n >ñ, and consider increasing n to n + 1. Considering the profits under s L and under s H , we know that the change in either profit level is determined solely by any additional profits gained from upgrade n + 1, because our assumptions of decreasing marginal-revenue and decreasing returns to quality ensure that the monotonicity constraints Z i ≥ Z i+1 can be ignored for interior upgrade supplies, as explained in the text. is strictly positive. Together, these facts plus the observation that the true marginal-revenue associated with upgrade i is ∆q n+1 MR s (z) imply that the additional profits available in upgrade market n + 1 are higher under s H than s L .
Proof of Proposition 12. Fix s and consider the set of unconstrained upgrade supplies {Z * is } that maximize profits in each of the upgrade markets. To prove the desired result, it is to sufficient to show that no product that is in positive supply for some s is set to zero supply as s rises. Suppose Z * is > Z * (i+1)s , so that the complete product i is in positive supply. If for some higher s , product i is not being supplied, then either Z * is = Z * (i+1)s = 1 or Z * is = Z * (i+1)s = 0, where we can rule out interior possibilities because ∆c i /∆q i is strictly increasing and marginal revenue is decreasing, as discussed in the text. Now, it cannot be that Z * is = Z * (i+1)s = 1, since MR s (1) is decreasing in s, so that the fact Z * (i+1)s < 1 implies Z * (i+1)s < 1. Also, it can't be that Z * is = Z * (i+1)s = 0, since MR s (0) = P s (0) is increasing in s, so that Z * is > 0 implies that Z * is > 0.
Proof of Claim in Footnote 21 on Page 15. To prove this claim, we set c = 0 without loss of generality, so that π(s) = (s + µ(s)) 2 /8s. If π(s) achieves a strictly profitable (π(s) > 0) maximum at some interior s ∈ (s L , s H ) then the first-order condition π (s) = 0 must be satisfied. Differentiating π(s), we obtain π (s) = (s + µ(s))[2s(1 + µ (s)) − (s + µ(s))] 8s 2 = 0 ⇒ s + µ(s) ∈ {0, 2s(1 + µ (s))}.
Since we are restricting to strictly profitable maxima, it must be the case that π(s) > 0 and hence µ(s) + s > 0. This simply says that the highest type consumer (with valuation µ(s) + s, by definition) is willing to pay the marginal cost of production. For π (s) = 0 to be satisfied, it must be the case that s + µ(s) = 2s(1 + µ (s)). Now, since profits are locally maximized, the second-order condition π (s) ≤ 0 must be satisfied: where the final equality follows after substituting in the first order condition. Following the re-introduction of the marginal cost c, this is the desired expression.
Proof of Claim in Footnote 49 on Page 29. For the counter-example to the quasi-convexity of profits, we need to find a dispersion index [s L , s H ] such that z † s is decreasing for some s. To do this, we begin by specifying functions κ 2 (s) and ψ(s) that are increasing and continuous in s, and then set P s (z) = P κ 2 (s),ψ(s) (z). This yields a family of demand curves ordered by a sequence of local rotations. As part of this, let us ensure that for s = s , a local increase in s raise ψ but not κ 2 . This implies z
